With AC Milan kicking off their 2023-24 Serie A campaign in a few days, it feels like the right time to pick out some some tactical observations from the highest profile preseason friendlies against Real Madrid, Juventus, Barcelona and Monza.
Across these games, there were a number of recurring tendencies of Milan’s approach in possession, specifically in their build-up play. @Tactics_Tweets picks through some of the things we saw during the aforementioned matches.
Player minutes
Before getting into the tactical detail, Figure 1 below showcases the number of minutes the Milan players played across these four fixtures and their most typical position.
Although, it is worth highlighting that Milan’s system adjusted in and out of possession.
Whilst pre-season can be about sharing minutes across the squad, it can also be an indicator as to which players may get game time when competitive action commences.
As the visual above demonstrates, the three players with the highest number of minutes across these friendlies were; 1) Ruben Loftus-Cheek (321), 2) Fikayo Tomori (315) and 3) Rade Krunić (301). The latter’s volume of minutes adds weight to Pioli’s desire to keep the Bosnian midfielder.
Build-up play
A key aspect of Milan’s in possession approach across these games were their various structures in build-up i.e. when they had the ball in their own or middle third of the pitch. (For clarity, there will also be out of possession factors behind these structures too).
Two predominant recurrences were; 1) one or both of their full-backs inverting into central areas of the pitch, alongside the midfield pivot (most typically Krunić) and 2) the full-backs staying wide, with Tijjani Reijnders dropping lower to form a temporary double pivot alongside Krunić.
The general rationale behind both of these build-up structures is that, in possession, Milan can unsettle the opposition’s defensive structure by forcing them into decisions.
Then, in any moments of uncertainty or hesitancy, Milan can take advantage of opportunities which may subsequently present themselves to bypass the opposition first lines of defence and ultimately, progress the ball up the pitch.
The different opportunities that can (and did) arise for Milan from using these two specific build up structures are best described using the various examples below.
In the first example (see below), from the Real Madrid game, both Davide Calabria (right-back) and Alessandro Florenzi (left-back) have inverted alongside Krunić.
Also, note how this has 1) allowed their two central defenders to widen and 2) given their goalkeeper time on the ball to assess his passing options.
The two Madrid forwards, tasked with covering Jan-Carlo Simić and Tomori, were split wide. Therefore, to try and prevent Milan passing and progressing through the centre (into their inverted full-backs) the Madrid midfield diamond was forced to react.
Jude Bellingham’s role, as the tip of the diamond, was to cover Krunić, so his job was in-hand. However, the left and right side of the diamond, Eduardo Camavinga and Federico Valverde respectively, had to stick or twist.
Camavinga decided to push further infield and higher up the pitch to cover Calabria, leaving space on the right flank. Whereas Valverde, visibly caught between two minds in the visual above, hesitates as he’s unsure whether to push up to Florenzi or stay with Tommaso Pobega behind.
In this sequence, as Milan are aware they have pulled a number of Madrid players up the pitch, Marco Sportiello opted to go long towards the free(ish) Pobega, as seen below.
Here’s a similar situation from the Barcelona game. Florenzi’s inversion has triggered two Barcelona opponents to move towards him, subsequently creating space on the right wing for Loftus-Cheek to pull out into and receive a clipped pass from Mike Maignan, before carrying the ball forward.
Milan again used this tactic to bait the opposition higher and then bypass opponents with an aerial pass, but this time used the space in the wide channels to progress the ball upfield.
In the next example, from the Juventus game, Milan are facing a 5-3-2 defensive shape, seen below.
In this situation, Milan manufactured an opportunity to bypass the opposition’s first line of defence (two strikers) by using Reijnders dropping lower to form a temporary double pivot alongside Krunić and Theo Hernández (out of shot) pushing higher on the left wing.
Hernández’s advanced positioning helped a) vacate the left full-back slot and b) pin the Juventus right wing-back from jumping forward to press.
Then, from his initial lower double pivot position, Reijnders’ timed his movement away from the left full-back area too (thus dragging the nearby midfielder with him). This build-up sequence was also aided by the two central defenders splitting wider across the pitch.
This coordinated positioning and movements created space (yellow circle) for Mike Maignan to clip a pass to Tomori who had space ahead of him to first receive and then progress up the pitch into the middle third.
And whilst it did not have an impact on this passage of play, you can also see Florenzi beginning to invert in the visual above. The reasoning for this was that when possession reached the middle third of the pitch, Florenzi was already in position to provide Milan with an additional player in central areas to help with ball retention/further progression and – in the event of any turnovers occurring – be in a prime spot to counter-press.
In this next example, in the game against Barcelona, Florenzi has inverted alongside Krunić (see below). In this scenario, the tactic of inverting a full-back helped unsettle Barcelona’s 4-4-2 high block, as their forward and midfield lines are unsure as to whose responsibility it is to cover this additional player in central areas.
As a result of this uncertainty and hesitation (plus, poor defensive decision making), seen below, you can see how this generated Milan a 4v3 central overload and created an opportunity to vertically progress possession, through the opposition’s defensive lines.
Also note Malick Thiaw, his wider positioning and movement to offer a pass out wide caused the Barcelona left-sided midfielder to separate from his central midfielder, helping create the passing lane into Loftus-Cheek.
In this final example, from the game against Monza, Milan have positioned their full-backs wider and Reijnders has dropped lower to form a temporary double pivot.
With Monza defending in a 5-2-1-2 shape, there was lots of space for Milan to progress possession in wide areas. And this, coupled with Reijnders’ lower initial positioning pinning the near-side opposition central midfielder, meant that Milan not only accessed the middle third of the pitch with relative ease, but once accessed, there was an opportunity to quickly enter the final third too.
As shown in the next screenshot, you can see how Hernández was able to progress into the middle third uncontested and as a result, one of the back five is forced to jump out to engage.
Above, Milan executed a third man combination to get Hernández in behind, but as shown below – where this sequence concludes – you can see that the ball overruns to the Monza goalkeeper.
Linked to their build-up play, another notable tendency of Milan in possession was ball carrying. This simply means Milan’s players ability to take the ball forward, often over distance and at speed e.g. a player carrying the ball from Milan’s own third into the final third.
With the profile of players recruited in the summer (Loftus-Cheek, Reijnders, Pulisic and Samuel Chukwueze), added to the profile of players already in their squad (Rafael Leão and Hernández), expect ball carrying to become a frequent tool – and potentially effective weapon – in Milan’s possession/attacking approach this forthcoming season.
The reason ball carrying can compliment Milan’s build-up play is that, as highlighted earlier, if Milan are able to bait the opposition higher, and work possession to one of their many ball carrying players, then there will be more space to progress into and potentially exploit.
This can result in Milan getting up the pitch quicker, to execute either fast, direct attacks, or force the opposition to retreat, thus allowing Milan more time in settled possession in the middle or final third.
Summary
It is worth noting that across these four friendlies, Milan scored five goals and four of them came from set-pieces and the other was an individual moment of quality from Luka Romero.
Therefore, the possession aspects referenced in this article are more intended as clues as to Stefano Pioli’s potential plans for the new season, in general and against certain opposition, as opposed to current effectiveness.
However, Milan’s various build-up structures did showcase multiple ways that the Rossoneri can bypass the opposition and progress possession, either centrally, in wide channels or directly via long passes.
Whilst having multiple progression methods and build-up structures in their armoury has its rewards, there are risks attached.
By baiting the opposition and trying to build-up from their own third, in addition to inverting their full-backs and therefore exposing wide channels in transition, Milan can be vulnerable to conceding dangerous attacks.
In these games, there were multiple moments where Milan’s build-up was susceptible to individual errors (Tomori most commonly guilty) or effective opposition defensive organisation, which led to conceding high quality chances and goals.
But pre-season is about preparation, and as Pioli said himself following the USA Tour: “…what I’ve seen is certainly positive. The new players are adapting well, then it’s clear that time is needed.”
On Monday evening, time will be up. Bologna will be the first test for this new look Milan, in what they hope will be a positive 2023/24 season.
