GdS: Compactness and the ‘cage’ – how Fonseca’s moves disrupted Inter’s plans

Paulo Fonseca has rightly drawn praise for his bold tactical decisions ahead of and during AC Milan’s derby win over Inter, but what exactly did he do to beat the champions?

As La Gazzetta dello Sport recall, Fonseca managed to somehow transform the disjointed mess of Tuesday’s defeat against Liverpool into a team that were not only winners in the derby but they dominated and deserved it.

He started with a 4-4-2 that was in reality a 4-2-4 which was like something from a Subbuteo table, with a line of four men used to screen and disrupt Inter’s initial build-up phase and then two midfielders who took turns moving out to help when Inter went out wide.

A four-man defensive line remained behind them that was certainly not flawless (Dimarco’s goal was caused by a bad decision to push up by Emerson Royal), but still more attentive than in previous outings. It was a compact Milan when Inter had the ball, with everyone inside 20 metres.

The winning move however, beyond a game system that – as Fonseca pointed out – did not differ too much from other games, was the cage on the two Nerazzurri midfielders. On the Rossoneri’s left flank, Barella was often cut off because Rafael Leao took a few steps back, Theo a few steps forward and Reijnders a few steps to the side.

The same was the case on the opposite side with Christian Pulisic, Emerson and Youssouf Fofana on Mkhitaryan. And those who remember the last derbies know perfectly well that Inter won them thanks to the counter-attacks and runs of the midfielders. Fonseca in most cases managed to eliminate all his passing lines.

With the ball at their feet, Milan were very fluid, partially freeing themselves from the 4-2-4 strictly applied in the defensive phase. Sometimes it was a classic 4-2-3-1, with Morata behind Abraham, sometimes a 4-1-4-1, with Fofana in front of the defense and Reijnders supporting the build-up centrally next to Morata.

Alvaro may not be very flashy, but as always, he was valuable in the link-up work. Pulisic, however, did not play as a pure winger and often came inside the field, confusing the Nerazzurri’s attempts to mark that particular zone they expected him to be in.

Leao, for once, was more applied and useful in the non-possession phase. Milan had also tried a similar tactical plan against Liverpool, but it had not succeeded: the departments had become disjointed after a quarter of an hour. This time, though, it worked a charm.