How Allegri’s 4-3-3 was ruthlessly exposed: Tactical analysis of AC Milan 0-3 Udinese

AC Milan fell to their worst defeat of the season at San Siro on Saturday evening as they were beaten 3-0 by Udinese.

After a positive start by Milan, they found themselves two goals down at the break as they failed to contain Udinese’s transitions. Davide Bartesaghi deflected in a cross and Jurgen Ekkelenkamp scored a header to put Kosta Runjaic’s side in command.

Arthur Atta added a third goal in the final 20 minutes to put the game to bed, and it could have been more in truth as nothing went right on the night. From being title hopefuls, Massimiliano Allegri’s men are now five points clear of fifth, a gap that was nine points two games ago.

Set-ups and shape

The major news regarding the starting line-up was that Allegri chose to go with a 4-3-3. It featured an attacking trio that consisted of Alexis Saelemaekers and Christian Pulisic either side of Rafael Leao. That meant Zachary Athekame came into the side, playing at right-back.

What made it a good test for Milan was that Udinese came and played their usual 3-5-2. Okoye was in goal, with Kristensen, Kabasele and Solet ahead, then Ehizibue, Ekkelenkamp, ​​Karlstrom, Atta and Kamara across the midfield line, plus Zaniolo and Davis as the dynamic duo up top.

Allegri essentially removed an extra centre-back from the system and added an additional forward, trading defensive security for attacking presence.

While this adjustment allowed Milan to overload Udinese’s centre-backs and apply greater pressure in the final third, it also meant sacrificing the safety net that the spare defender usually provides. Ultimately, this imbalance proved costly, as Milan were left numerically short in defensive situations.

Udinese operated in a compact mid-block, focusing on denying central progression. By overloading the passing lanes into Modrić and Rabiot, they effectively cut off Milan’s primary routes through midfield, forcing them to bypass the centre and resort to longer, less controlled balls forward.

Milan utilised coordinated winger–full-back interactions, particularly between Pulisic and Bartesaghi. Pulisic would drift inside into narrower positions, which in turn opened up the flank for Bartesaghi to advance and create overloads in wide areas.

Building on these winger–full-back dynamics, Athekame and Bartesaghi held the width, while Pulisic and Saelemaekers tucked inside, with Leão also dropping into central areas.

This positional structure created a central overload, giving Milan multiple passing options between the lines and improving their ability to combine through the middle.

Plan starts to unravel

For Udinese’s first goal, Milan failed to contain Zaniolo in the wide areas – zones that are typically less threatening – and instead allowed him to carry the ball into central space, where the danger significantly increased.

During the same transition, Atta intelligently peeled off toward the right wing, but this movement went unnoticed by Bartesaghi.

Rather than maintaining positional discipline and covering the wide option, Bartesaghi drifted inward, leaving Atta unmarked.

This lapse meant that, had the ball been played wide, Udinese had a free outlet, further exposing Milan’s defensive structure.

For Udinese’s second goal, a similar pattern of defensive disorganisation emerged. Keinan Davis drifted into the wide areas, drawing both Pavlović and Modrić toward him in an attempt to win the ball, effectively creating a 2v1 on the flank.

Bartesaghi, once again, found himself in a position of indecision, caught in no man’s land. He neither closed the passing lane for the cut-back to Zaniolo nor recovered into the box to provide defensive cover against the incoming cross. This lack of clarity allowed Udinese to progress the move cleanly.

When the cross was eventually delivered, De Winter failed to deal with it effectively, and Udinese capitalised to score.

Desperate changes

Milan introduced Füllkrug in place of Athekame to establish a stronger central presence, something Leão had not consistently provided in that role.

While Füllkrug offered a clear target in the box and the ability to occupy centre-backs, Milan failed to fully utilise his strengths, as they did not deliver crosses into the area with enough frequency to maximise his aerial and hold-up qualities.

Milan shifted to a 3-4-3 in the second half, with Allegri effectively ‘threw the kitchen sink’ in pursuit of a goal. Saelemaekers was pushed higher up the pitch, adding to the attacking line and increasing Milan’s presence in advanced areas as they committed more numbers forward.

Once again, Milan were exposed in transition, conceding from a fast break following an Udinese goal kick where they won the second ball. This immediately created a 3v2 advantage in Udinese’s favour, putting Milan’s back line under pressure.

Bartesaghi, yet again, found himself in no man’s land – not effectively marking a player nor occupying a key defensive space – which further weakened the structure.

As the move developed, a clear lack of communication emerged between De Winter and Maignan, with both gravitating toward covering the far post. This left the near-post zone completely unprotected, allowing Atta a straightforward finish to make it 3-0 to Udinese.

The data

Milan generated chances worth 1.7 xG but managed only 0.36 xGOT, highlighting a significant drop-off between chance creation and shot execution.

While the underlying opportunities suggested they could have scored at least once, the quality of their shots on target was extremely poor, reflecting inefficiency in finishing and suboptimal shot placement.